Abstract-One of the main challenges for decision scientists in the 21st century will be managing systems of ever increasing complexity. As systems like electrical power grids, computer networks, and the software that controls it all grow increasingly complex, fragility, bugs, and security flaws are becoming increasingly prevalent and problematic. It is natural then to ask what consequences this growing complexity has on our ability to manage these systems. In this paper, we take a first step toward addressing this question with the development of the Fundamental matrix, a framework for analyzing the broad qualitative nature of decision making. With the Fundamental matrix we explain in a qualitative way many theorems and known results about optimization, complexity, and security. The simplicity of the explanations leads to new insights toward potential research directions. Like other "theories" dealing with broad fundamental properties, however, the Fundamental matrix has certain limitations that make it largely descriptive. Thus, instead of claiming the last words our goal is to stimulate a dialog and debate that may one day lead to a prescriptive science of complexity.
At the heart of any decision task is an optimization problem-we are always seeking the decision that is "best" in some sense. Certainly there are limits to optimization. The No Free Lunch Theorem (NFLT) of optimization [6] , [7] , [17] , [19] is a basic result. The essence of the NFLT is that there is no universal optimization procedure of any kind (decision-making strategy, search algorithm, etc.) that produces better solutions than all others on all problems or even on all instances of a particular problem. The conclusion is that we cannot a priori expect a solution to yield good performance unless it explicitly exploits the "structure" of the particular optimization problem under consideration (e.g., its linearity, convexity, monotonicity). However, even solutions able to exploit problem structure seem to face fundamental limits. In particular, the theory of highly optimized tolerance (HOT) [2] , a theory of complex systems, argues that designs highly optimized and robust toward one set of assumed problem instances can be very fragile and may fail catastrophically when faced with problem instances that are outside the original design assumptions. 1 This "robust yet fragile" nature seems an inescapable property of large-scale engineered systems.
In this paper we begin with three basic assumptions (explained and justified in Section II)-a finite world assumption (all variables come from discrete, finite domains), an uncertain world assumption (there are always things we can not measure, model, and/or control), and an Intractability Assumption (we are not capable of design procedures demanding exponentially growing effort). Using these assumptions as axioms, we develop a conceptual framework-the Fundamental matrix or F-matrix (Section II)-that provides an intuitive, common sense, yet rigorous framework for understanding the origins and reasons for some fundamental limitations in optimization, complexity, and security. In particular, with the F-matrix we explain in a simple, yet rigorous way the NFLTs (Section III), the robust yet fragile nature of HOT designs (Section IV), and the origins of the basic difficulty with security (Section V). In addition, analysis with the F-matrix framework leads to additional insights and conclusions that imply that there may indeed be fundamental limits to our ability to optimize (Section IV) and secure systems (Section V) of increasing complexity.
The "science of complexity" although several decades old (see, e.g., [17] ) is still an immature and primarily descriptive science. Even the definition of "complexity" itself is not firm [12] . Recognizing this, we do not claim to have the last word on the subject. In particular, while the results presented in this paper are rigorous, they are only so within the context of our assumptions and our own definition of complexity, which to some may appear sweeping and controversial. Moreover, our results too are largely descriptive rather than prescriptive. Ultimately, a prescriptive science of complexity is what the decision sciences must contribute. If this paper provokes debate and provides the reader with useful insight toward a prescriptive science of complexity, then our goal has been accomplished.
The plan for the rest of this paper is the following. In Section II, we state our assumptions and from these develop the Fundamental matrix, a conceptual framework for analyzing the fundamental nature of decision-making and optimization. In Section III, the framework is applied to provide a simple, intuitive explanation for the NFLTs, the basic impossibility theorems of optimization. In Section IV, we give an operational definition of complexity and then explore what it implies for our ability to design high performance, robust systems in the face of increasing complexity. Section V then explores the issue of security against adversaries. The paper concludes in Section VI.
II. FUNDAMENTAL MATRIX
At the heart of any decision task is an optimization problem. Whether it is a decision to choose the parameters of a controller, a decision about the layout of a factory, or a decision about a computer network security strategy, it all revolves around making a choice from a population of alternatives so as to optimize a certain objective.
With that in mind, the starting point is an input space and an output space . The input space is the population of alternatives (decisions, solutions, designs), and the outputs are their performances relative to an objective (to be defined shortly).
Let us now make three basic assumptions.
Assumption 2.1 Finite World Assumption (FWA):
All variables come from discrete, finite domains.
There is no loss of generality in this assumption since in the material world resources are discrete and finite, e.g., dollars, people, machines, computers, building material, etc., and prevailing theory is that the universe itself is discrete (quantized) and finite (in mass and energy) [5] , [10] . Moreover, the digital computer-today's tool of choice for decision making-is discrete and finite (finite word length and finite total memory).
With discrete and finite input space of size (cardinality) and discrete and finite output space of size , the number of unique mappings, , must also be finite. In particular, by simple enumeration, . In principle, we can tabulate all of these mappings in a matrix. To do so, let us index the elements of the input space as , and the mappings as . How the elements of and are indexed is entirely arbitrary. Regarding the output (performance) space, let us assume its elements can be ordered and let us index them so that . Furthermore, since ultimately all that is necessary for optimization is the ability to compare performances, let us use performance rank and define with 0 the worst performance and the best. 
Definition 2.1 Fundamental Matrix:
For given discrete, finite sets and , the Fundamental Matrix (abbreviated F-matrix) is the by matrix with , -th entry equal to , i.e., the -th column is a vector representing the mapping and the , -the entry is the performance of input on mapping . An example F-matrix for the case where and is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Notice that the columns of this F-matrix were obtained by simply counting in binary from 111 down to 000. In general, we would count down, modulo-, through all of the -digit numbers. The F-matrix in Fig. 1 is in what we call the counting form. There is no loss of generality in assuming the counting form, since if an F-matrix is not in this form, all we need to do is reindex the elements of and . By doing so we can interchange the rows and columns as needed. Since the counting form will make our subsequent discussion more clear and easier to follow, let us henceforth assume that all F-matrices are in the counting form.
With the F-matrix in counting form, two things are immediately clear: 1) the columns of an F-matrix are unique and 2) the columns of an F-matrix represent the totality of all possible unique mappings between a specified input space and specified output space .
Assumption 2.2 Uncertain World Assumption (UWA):
There are always things we cannot measure, model, or control, i.e., we are never entirely certain what performance an input will yield.
This assumption reflects uncertainty due to noise; limitations in our ability to formulate, describe, and communicate a problem or a decision; manufacturing tolerances in the actuators and system components; limited resolution in the sensors; unknown bugs in the control software; unanticipated user behaviors (malicious or just bizarre); and political, proprietary, or legal considerations that restrict what we are allowed to know and control. At the quantum level this is just another statement of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [5] , [10] .
The UWA leads to a distribution over the columns of the F-matrix. Specifically, let us define to be a random column index with mass function for all and . Then, for a given , we define . That is, the performance of input x is a random variable whose distribution is determined by the likelihood of the various mappings.
With the above assumptions and definitions, we can now state an optimization problem, where without loss of generality we assume maximization (1) In other words, in this paper we take a decision task as one to select the F-matrix row (decision, solution, design) that maxi-mizes the expected performance, with the expectation taken according to the likelihood of the various columns as determined by the distribution . Regarding our ability to solve (1), we make one final assumption.
Assumption 2.3 Intractability Assumption (IA):
The best we can achieve in practice is a solution that is optimized with respect to a number of mappings that scales as a polynomial function of the number of solution alternatives . The IA is patterned after the computational complexity notion of intractability [3] . Very roughly, computational complexity theory states that problems whose time (number of operations, instructions, memory accesses, etc.) to solve scales polynomially as the problem scales are considered tractable, while those whose time to solve grows exponentially as the problem scales are considered intractable. In other words, according to computational complexity theory, in practice we can only solve problems whose time to solve grows polynomially as the problem scales. In computational complexity theory, the class of tractable problems is known as the polynomial-time or complexity class P problems [3] .
Let us call those columns (mappings) we can optimize over the planned for columns, . The remaining columns are the unplanned for columns. By the IA, the number of planned for columns, , scales as a polynomial function of . What is important to notice is that while the number of planned for columns grows only polynomially in , the number of unplanned for columns grows exponentially in (according to ). Understanding the significance of this observation is the subject of much of the remainder of this paper.
A. Properties of Fundamental Matrices
Fundamental matrices have many interesting properties, several of which we will need for subsequent developments. The first three properties are stated as facts, since they are self-evident from the definition and construction of the F-matrix. The other two can be immediately verified by inspecting Fig. 1 ; formal proofs can be found in [7] . 
B. Examples
To help fix ideas, we give three examples to illustrate how various problems can be cast into the F-matrix framework. The first is an optimization problem (Traveling Salesman), the second an engineering design problem (automobile airbag system), and the third a security problem (computer network protection). Let us stress that these examples are only to fix ideas. The F-matrix is a conceptual construct not intended to answer specific questions about individual problems, but rather to address broader questions related to the fundamental nature of optimization itself (more on this later).
Optimization Example: The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) has cities configured on a Euclidean plane and the objective is to find the shortest round trip tour that visits each city once and then returns to the starting city. The TSP is a well-known problem that has been extensively studied in the computational complexity literature. 2 The TSP can be cast into the framework of the F-matrix in at least two ways. First, we can think of each row as a specific tour (with cities there are factorial possible tours), as the tour length (suitably discretized and ranked), as a specific configuration of the cities, and as our knowledge about the particular city configuration we are trying to solve. Alternatively, and much more generally, we can think of the as alternative optimization strategies or algorithms (e.g., brute force enumeration, random search, genetic algorithm, simulated annealing, greedy, etc.). Then is the performance of strategy on city configuration after the algorithm has run for a fixed amount of time.
Engineering Design Example: Consider the problem of designing a passenger safety system for an automobile. Similar to the previous TSP example, we can interpret the problem in one of two ways. First we can take as an -dimensional vector of airbag parameters (e.g., deployment force, airbag size and shape, when to trigger, when to deflate, etc.), the as the (ranked) risk of passenger injury, and as a distribution over likely passenger profiles (e.g., height, weight, seat position, etc.). Alternatively, we could take the to be protection strategies (e.g., should we use seatbelts, airbags, collapsible steering column, body crumple zones, or some combination of all of these?). Again, is the ranked risk of injury, but now gives the likelihood of different crash scenarios (e.g., frontal, offset, side, etc.).
Network Security Example: Finally, consider a simple three component computer network consisting of a client (C) connected by a link (L) to a server (S). Suppose, we can protect only two of the three components, for example, because of resource constraints or to tradeoff usability against security. To cast this into the framework of the F-matrix, let the rows be the solution alternatives:
protect the client and link, protect the client and server, and protect the link and server. Let the columns be the eight possible attack scenarios: no attack, an attack on the client, and attack on the link, an attack on the server, an attack on the client and link, an attack on the client and server, an attack on the link and server, and an attack on all three components. In this example, the distribution is determined by the behavior of some "intelligent" adversaries (hackers). Fig. 2 shows the F-matrix that results under the assumption that protected devices resist attack while unprotected ones fail when attacked. In the figure, device failure is indicated by putting a bar through the symbol representing that device. For example,
indicates that the server S will fail under protection strategy when all three components are simultaneously attacked (since under the server is not protected). Consequently, the matrix entries in Fig. 2 tell us which attacks (columns) our various protection strategies (rows) can withstand. Note, the size of the F-matrix in this security example depends entirely on the level of detail included in the model, with Fig. 2 an obviously very crude abstraction.
The three examples illustrate the three different ways that we will use the distribution . When discussing the NFLTs (Section III) we follow [19] and [20] , and use to represent our knowledge and assumptions about the mapping we are working on. In exploring complexity (Section IV), we take to capture the disturbances and uncertainties imposed on the system by "nature," e.g., due to noise, modeling error, control error, measurement error, user behavior, and so forth. Finally, in discussing security (Section V) we use to capture the likelihood of the various attack scenarios chosen by malicious adversaries.
C. Section Summary
This section introduced the F-matrix and listed several of its key properties. The F-matrix is the tool we will use for the analysis in the rest of the paper. The basic idea is to think of its rows as alternatives (decisions, solutions, designs), its columns as different mappings (problem instances, scenarios, situations), and its entries as performance rankings (small numbers bad, large ones good). The decision goal-defined by equation (1)-is to choose the F-matrix row that gives the best expected performance, with the expectation taken according to column probabilities . The F-matrix is a conceptual framework that encompasses within it all possible optimization problems involving an input set and an output set . As such the F-matrix provides a powerful tool to explain and get insight into the "global" qualitative nature of optimization itself. On the other hand, it is important to understand that the F-matrix cannot generally answer "local" quantitative questions about individual or specific optimization examples. There are several reasons for this. First, the F-matrix does not reveal the effort required to obtain the value . In complex systems, we know that this process is certainly not just as easy as a matrix lookup, but rather a complicated time consuming experiment, simulation, or numerical procedure. For the airbag design example, for instance, obtaining may require many simulations coupled with extrapolations from expensive crash tests and accident investigations. Second, it is reasonable to assume that in a real system not all mappings are feasible due to constraints set by physical laws and the problem's definition. For the TSP, for example, only mappings that are symmetric are feasible since the tour length is direction independent. Finally, the F-matrix cannot be used to solve actual problems anyway, since the memory required to store it is prohibitive for all but the most trivial examples.
For the remainder of this paper, let us assume (as in Fig. 1 ) that the performance space has been partitioned into the binary set with "0" being unsatisfactory (bad) performance and "1" being satisfactory (good) performance. This assumption will make the presentation simpler and more accessible. Note that in making this assumption we place no restrictions on the size of the output space-all results hold for arbitrary . Thus, when we refer to Fig. 1 to illustrate a point, it is not because the result only holds for such a small F-matrix, but because for larger we can no longer write out the matrix for visual inspection. We claim that the binary assumption does not detract from the qualitative conclusions we will draw or their significance. Larger is simply adds detail and granularization that, while it may change quantitative results, does not appreciably change the qualitative conclusions one can draw.
III. NFLTs
The F-matrix was originally introduced in [7] and [8] to prove and explain the NFLTs and their consequences in a way that is simple, intuitive, yet still rigorous. In that work, as well as here, the interpretation and significance of the results hinges on the meaning attached to the elements of and . For example, if we take to be the space of all possible strategies 3 and the set to be the universe of all possible problems, then the fact that all rows in an F-matrix have the same average (Lemma 2.1) leads immediately to the most general version of the NFLT [7] , [8] .
If we have no prior knowledge about the problem (column) we are trying to optimize, then we must assume that all problems (columns) are equally likely, in which case, we cannot a priori expect any strategy (row) to perform any better than any other. In other words, there exists no strategy (regardless of its sophistication) that can outperform all others on all problems, or 3 In the decision sciences, the concept of strategy is fundamental. By strategy, we mean a mapping from the information one has available to the decisions one can make. Thus, methods involving open loops, feedback, search, iteration, recursion, learning, intelligence, adaptation, games, deliberation, inference, voting, markets, randomness, evolution, centralized control, decentralized control, self-organization, emergence, and even approaches with humans in the loop are all strategies in one form or another. Nothing can be more inclusive or more general (without violating causality). even on all instances of a particular problem, i.e., universal optimizers are impossible. Even humans, who sometimes seem to be capable of universal problem solving, are bound by the NFLT. In particular, while it may seem like the scientific method is a universal problem solving strategy, it only appears so because we stand on the "shoulders of giants;" we never start from a state of zero prior knowledge.
In the other hand, if we take the 's to be points in an -dimensional vector space then we can address the NFLT for search first proved by Wolpert and Macready in [19] and [20] . In the language of the F-matrix, that work considered search algorithms that, beginning with no prior knowledge about which column (mapping) is being worked on and guided only by the history of observed performances, sample distinct rows, and return the row that gives the best observed performance. In this case, the NFLT states that:
Without prior knowledge about the mapping, all search algorithms-no matter how "intelligently" or "stupidly" they use the history of observed performances-have the same a priori expected performance. In other words, without prior knowledge even simple blind random search (without replacement) can be expected to work just as well as any other search strategy.
To prove this result, we use Lemma 2.2 from Section II. To see how, consider Fig. 1 , and suppose initially we do not know which one of the eight columns we are working on. Given that all rows have equal expected performance (Lemma 2.1), let us choose as an initial guess , and suppose that the performance we observe has value 0 (bad). Then clearly we can eliminate from further consideration row (since we want distinct samples) and columns (since we know we are not working on any column for which ). What is left is the submatrix in Fig. 3 . However, this submatrix is itself an F-matrix (this is Lemma 2.2). Consequently, because we still do not know any more about which one of the remaining columns we are working on, we have no way to decide which of the remaining alternatives or might be better (since by Lemma 2.1 they have identical expected performance over the remaining columns). In other words, because the search process keeps peeling the original F-matrix down into smaller and smaller F-matrices (by Lemma 2.2), there is never any information revealed that can give one search strategy advantage over any other (due to Lemma 2.1). Hence, unless prior knowledge about the mapping has been incorporated into the search strategy, then we should not expect it to work any better than random sampling. Additional NFLTs with significance to stochastic optimization and representations can be found in [7] . We also remark that similar NFLTs have also been developed for learning and classification (cf. [4] ). This is not surprising, since these problems can usually be cast as optimization problems.
It has been claimed that quantum computers will be able to solve many optimization problems thought to be intractable on today's digital computers due to the parallelism inherent in the superposition of quantum states [18] . Are quantum computers somehow immune to the NFLTs? We claim they are not, and our argument goes like this. Consider a deterministic optimization problem, where we are trying to optimize a specific column of the F-matrix, but we have no knowledge about which columns are feasible or which column we are working on. Then the column we are working on could equally likely be any one of the columns in the F-matrix-the standard NFLT assumption. What we face then is a so-called unstructured list search problem. That is, we have a list (column) with entries, and we want to search for a list entry that contains the largest performance value. Without loss of generality assume , i.e., we are searching the list for an entry containing a "1." There may be many "1's" in the list or there may be none, we have no prior knowledge to tell us. Simple inspection of an F-matrix immediately reveals that no matter how many "0's" we have found so far as we search the list, we can never be sure that the list does not contain a "1" in some entry that we have not yet checked. Thus, the number of list lookup operations we will have to do is on the order of . This list search problem seems like a naturally parallelizable problem that a quantum computer should be able to solve with ease, even without prior knowledge about the structure of the list (mapping). As [6] shows, however, this is not the case. Indeed quantum computation can speed up the unstructured list search problem from a number of operations on the order of to a number on the order of . However, given that often grows exponentially with the dimension, number of parameters, etc., even quantum algorithms must incorporate problem structure in order to tackle truly large problems.
The NFLTs speak to the issue of the value of knowledge and the limits we run up against when we lack knowledge or refuse to make any assumptions. In particular, the NFLTs take to be uniform over the columns of the F-matrix. On the other hand, it is obvious from even the simple F-matrix in Fig. 1 that the NFLTs do not hold when is not uniform over the columns. For example, if in Fig. 1 , then has the best expected performance, the worst, and the second best. Thus, when is not uniform (as we argue will be the case for any practical real-world problem) then, in general, some solutions are better than others. In the terminology of [19] and [20] these solutions are said to be aligned to the distribution in the sense that they are able to exploit the structural properties of the 's that weights the most heavily (e.g., their monotonicity, convexity, linearity, or some other structural characteristic). Roughly speaking, identifying the most heavily weighted 's for various problems and then developing decision making strategies to optimize these 's are the essence of the research and practice in the decision sciences.
On the other hand, there are many distributed, agent-based systems in nature-such as ant colonies, immune systems, and brains-where apparently simple strategies from the constituent parts emerges a collective behavior that is quite sophisticated, even intelligent [9] , [16] . Even the scientific method itself (hypothesize, test, revise) is not very sophisticated as a strategy. But what emerges when many scientists use this strategy and interact to share their results is very sophisticated indeed. A fact from the F-matrix is that every strategy, no matter how simple, is good for some problem (because every possible outcome appears an equal number of times in each row by Lemma 2.1). Thus, a reasonable future research direction in decision theory might involve (conceptually) a search for interesting "intersections" between the rows (representing simple strategies) and columns (problems) of the F-matrix.
IV. COMPLEXITY
The NFLTs formalize the common sense notion that if we don't know anything or refuse to assume anything, then as a consequence we should not expect anything either. The flip side is that if we have knowledge and make reasonable assumptions, then generally some solutions are indeed better than others. However, even with good knowledge and assumptions, there are still unavoidable limitations to our decision-making capabilities. The essence of these limitations is captured by the Intractability Assumption 2.3 (IA). This section explores the significance of the IA and what it implies about our ability to solve problems of ever growing "complexity."
In order to talk about complexity, we first need to define what we mean by complexity. In doing so, however, a word of caution is in order-the topic of complexity is itself very complex and far from mature. Even the definition of complexity has not stabilized. Lloyd [12] , for example, identifies over 30 definitions of complexity, which he groups by difficulty in system description, difficulty in system creation, and degree of organization. Rather than try to arbitrate among all of the various definitions and concepts, let us adopt the following operational definition and proceed from there.
Definition 4.1 Complexity:
The complexity of the optimization problem (1) is measured by the number of alternatives . From the point of view of solving (1), this appears a natural, pragmatic definition of complexity, since in practice more design choices-cities in a TSP, dimensions in a vector optimization problem, and protection strategies in a security problem-almost always requires more solution effort.
Complexity growth is natural, inevitable, and not always bad. In any system, natural or manmade, population growth requires support systems of growing complexity (e.g., larger cities, roadways, communication networks, supply chains, etc.). Furthermore, up to a certain point at least, increasing complexity can improve capabilities, performance, and robustness. Clearly, an airplane has more capabilities than a car (by virtue of more degrees of freedom); a higher order filter or controller can give better performance than a lower order one; and adding redundancy and feedback can improve robustness. However, given the IA and the bounds it imposes on the effort we can apply toward solving a problem, one might suspect that the benefits of increasing complexity can only be carried so far, and indeed we can establish the following, Lemma 4.1 Fundamental Complexity Limit: Under the FWA and the IA, as the number of alternatives increases without bound, the ratio of planned for columns to unplanned for columns decreases to zero. Conversely, the ratio of unplanned for columns to planned for columns increases to 1.
Proof: By the FWA (Assumption 2.1), we can enumerate the totality of all possible mappings from given domains and in an F-matrix with rows and columns (Definition 2.1). However, by the IA (Assumption 2.3) the number of planned for columns grows polynomially in . At the same time, the number of unplanned for columns grows exponentially in . Hence as Thinking of the columns as different problem instances, scenarios, or situations, the implication of this result is that with increasing complexity comes an increase in the chance that the system will face an unplanned for situation. When such an unplanned for situation occurs, we have the following.
Theorem 4.1 Fragility of Complex Systems:
Suppose the output space with "bad" and "good." As increases without bound, the fraction of bad outcomes in the unplanned for columns approaches 50%. In other words, should an unplanned for situation occur, there is a 50-50 chance the outcome will be bad, independent of how good the solution is for the planned for columns.
Proof: As grows without bound, the fraction of columns we can plan for vanishes (Lemma 4.1), so that in the limit of increasing all columns are unplanned for. In the limit then, we can appeal to the Counting Lemma (Lemma 2.2) to conclude that in a F-matrix 50% of the columns will have the value "0" and 50% the value "1" regardless of which row (solution, design) we choose. Hence, in the limit of increasing , 50% of the outcomes in the unplanned for columns will be good and 50% will be bad. Then because the IA (Assumption 2.3) prohibits us from doing the verification and certification tests needed to know how the solution performs on the unplanned for columns, it makes sense to expect all unplanned for columns to occur with equal probability, in which there is a 50-50 chance the outcome will be bad.
The conclusion we can draw thus far is this. As the complexity of a system increases without bound, the chance that the system will encounter an unplanned for situation also increases, and when an unplanned for situation occurs, the system's resulting performance in dealing with that situation is just as likely to be good as it is to be bad.
Notice, however, that the previous results only tell a part of the story, since typically the number of alternatives itself often grows exponentially fast. For instance, the number of tours in the TSP grows combinatorially in the number of cities ( cities implies factorial possible tours), and we are all familiar with the curse of dimensionality in vector optimization. 4 The implication here is that a decision problem may approach the above asymptotic limits very quickly indeed.
To dig deeper into the consequences of complexity, the following definition is helpful.
Definition 4.2 P-Optimality:
Assume with bad and good and that the number of planned for columns . A P-optimal solution (short for polynomial-optimal) is any row that gives good outcome for all of the planned for columns. In Fig. 1, for example, if the planned for columns , then solutions and are P-optimal. Conversely, any planned for set containing the all zero column (mapping in Fig. 1 ) will have no P-optimal solutions. In other words, there may be many P-optimal solutions or there may be none. However, as we show later in Theorem 4.2, it is reasonable to assume that there is at least one P-optimal solution. Assuming the existence of a P-optimal solution, we can study what happens as complexity increases by establishing a result that holds for any .
Theorem 4.2 Robust Yet Fragile:
Suppose with "bad" and "good," and let be any P-optimal solution. For any given , the outcome for a randomly chosen unplanned for column is more likely to be bad than it is to be good.
Proof: This result is a corollary of the Counting Lemma (Lemma 2.2). Quite simply each row of a binary F-matrix contains 50% zeros and 50% ones. Since is assumed to be a P-optimal solution, a fraction of the good outcomes (the 1's) are concentrated under the planned for columns. Consequently, under the unplanned for columns there is a slightly higher fraction of zeros than ones.
The notion of P-optimality is consistent with the highly optimized tolerant (HOT) designs of [2] . Similar to a HOT design, a P-optimal solution gives good performance over all of the planned for columns. That is, it is both highly optimized with respect to the planned for columns and tolerant to uncertainty within them. On the other hand, like a HOT design, a P-optimal solution is also fragile in the sense that its performance on an unplanned for column is more likely bad than good as Theorem 4.2 shows. Theorem 4.2 also provides a qualitative explanation for another property of HOT designs, namely that when HOT designs fail, the failure size distribution tends to be heavy tailed [2] . In other words, when "random" failures occur, large ones happen more frequently than one might otherwise expect based on the usual normality assumptions. If we think of the failures as resulting from the occurrence of unplanned for situations, then this observation follows from Theorem 4.2.
The robust yet fragile nature of P-optimal solutions also explains the famous law of unintended consequences. 5 The empirical observation that a solution that satisfies all of our planned for objectives can sometimes fail miserably in practice. It also explains the oft-quoted Murphy's law-if it can go wrong, it will go wrong. Specifically, in a complex system things "can go wrong" since we cannot plan for everything. Moreover, given the 50-50 chance of bad outcome with every unplanned for event, eventually an "unintended consequence" will occur, i.e., an unintended consequence will be uncovered or eventually "it will go wrong." We will not comment on how "bad" a bad outcome might be. However, the message is clear: as complexity increases, there are more things we cannot plan for than there are things we can plan for, and for those we cannot plan for it is likely some of them will lead to unsatisfactory results.
To continue, let us consider now an ideal case. In the ideal case, we have a binary F-matrix in the counting form as usual (see Fig. 1 ), but we add the additional assumption that the distribution over the columns, , is monotonically nonincreasing from left to right (i.e., the leftmost column is the most likely and the rightmost the least likely). Thus, in the ideal case, if we take the leftmost columns to be the planned for columns, then all rows giving 1's (good outcome) in these first columns are P-optimal solutions. 6 Note in general that the number of P-optimal solutions depends on how the planned for set is chosen. For some choices there are many P-optimal solutions, for others there are none. The ideal case defined previously is ideal in the sense that it is the case with the largest number of P-optimal solutions.
Theorem 4.2 P-optimality in the Ideal Case: Let and assume the ideal case as defined before (i.e., the F-matrix is in its counting form and is monotonically nonincreasing from left to right across its columns). In this ideal case, the number of P-optimal solutions (i.e., solutions giving "1's" in the first columns) is given by ceil (
Here, ceil returns the least integer not less than . Proof: It should be clear from the construction of a binary F-matrix that the first columns of the first row give outcome "1," the first columns of the second row give outcome "1," or, in general, the first columns of -th row give outcome "1." Therefore, the number of P-optimal solutions is given by the largest integer i such that . Taking the logarithm of both sides gives , which upon maximizing gives the desired result.
The implication of the above is the following. Suppose for the sake of argument that is fixed. Then for too small, there may be no P-optimal solutions. That is, no matter what row we pick there is at least one column in the planned for set P that gives outcome "0," i.e., our solution lacks "robustness." However, we can increase robustness by increasing (system complexity), since as is increased the number of P-optimal solutions likewise increases. This provides qualitative support for the argument made in HOT theory that much of the complexity-in both human-engineered and biological systems-is due to redundancy and feedback loops included for tolerance or robustness [2] .
Although not stated directly, we have been implicitly assuming that the distribution of likely columns, , extends over more columns that we can plan for. This seems reasonable for real-world problems, where we cannot even know let alone plan for every potential present or future eventuality. Continuing with the ideal case, let us refer to the set of columns for which as . For the remaining columns we assume , i.e., they are not feasible. Let us further assume that . If we were not constrained by the IA, then we could entertain the possibility of finding the true optimal solution-a solution that gives good outcome for all columns in . Let us call such a solution a super-optimal or -optimal solution. Now, of course, an S-optimal solution is also a P-optimal solution. However, in the ideal case, the chance that an arbitrarily selected P-optimal solution is S-optimal becomes vanishingly small as shown next.
Theorem 4.3 S-Optimality in the Ideal Case:
Assume and let be any P-optimal solution. In the ideal case, the probability that is also S-optimal is given by ceil ceil
For the case of , the S-optimal solution is unique and the probability that a randomly chosen P-optimal solution is the unique S-optimal solution turns out to be ceil Proof: This result follows from Theorem 4.2. In the ideal case there are ceil P-optimal solutions, but only ceil S-optimal solutions. Choosing randomly from among the P-optimal solutions gives the first part of the result. The second part follows from the fact that ceil . The implication of this result is this. By the IA, the best we can hope to achieve due to our limited recourse is a P-optimal solution. But knowing that in practice we cannot plan for everything, we also know that not all P-optimal solutions will give the same performance, e.g., the S-optimal ones. However, although we may not have resources to systematically obtain an S-optimal solution, the following result suggests that we might be able to at least verify whether or not a given P-optimal solution is in fact S-optimal. Of course, we will not be able to do this deterministically (as that would violate the IA), but we can do it with high probability.
Theorem 4.4 Verification of S-Optimality in the Ideal Case:
Assume the ideal case with and let be any P-optimal solution. Define as the set of columns such that and assume that for some , . Now, randomly choose columns from among the set . If the outcome is "1" (good) for all columns, then the probability that solution is not S-optimal is bounded above by ceil (4) Proof: The number of different ways of picking columns from among is . The number of such selections for which an arbitrarily selected row gives "1's" for all selected columns is . Thus, the number of selections for which some solution (other than an S-optimal) gives '1's in all columns is no more than ceil The bound in (4) then follows from:
In other words, what this proposition implies is this. Suppose we have found a good solution, say a P-optimal one. If we then further test the solution against randomly chosen mappings and the performance on all of these tests is good, then the probability the solution is not S-optimal is bounded above by ceil , a quantity that quickly vanishes with increasing . Thus, while in practice deterministic procedures for obtaining an S-optimal solution are generally beyond our computational recourse, the effort required to probabilistically verify whether or not our solution is S-optimal is within our computational capacity.
In closing this section, it may seem that we have been assuming that obtaining P-optimal solutions is trivial. Of course, we know this is not true. To illustrate intuitively the difficulty, consider the extreme case where and only one column say is possible. Then, all we need is any solution such that . On one hand, if can equally likely be any column of the F-matrix, then the expected number of solutions we would have to examine in order to find a solution such that is . Recalling that itself is often huge (e.g., exponential in the number degrees of freedom, dimensions, etc.), it becomes clear that without knowledge as to which we are trying to solve, obtaining a P-optimal solution can be almost hopeless (recall the NFLT, Section II). On the other hand, even knowing precisely which column we are working on does not imply the problem is solved. It usually only means that we have some very explicit knowledge about the structural properties of (e.g., monotonicity, linearity, convexity, etc.), but it does not mean we know the optimal solution. Solving high-dimensional deterministic vector optimization problems, particularly nonlinear ones, is generally quite hard. The stochastic case, where we have a distribution over a subset of the columns, is even more difficult, involving a breadth-depth process to allocate resources between exploring the different solution alternatives (breadth search) and obtaining better estimates of their expected performances (depth evaluation) [11] .
V. SECURITY
The F-matrix also has strong implications for designing secure systems. For this purpose, we regard a column of the F-matrix as a choice made by an intelligent adversary. In other words, as is common in the security literature, we view security as a game. In this game the designer moves first by choosing a solution . The adversary then follows by choosing an attack scenario . If the attack succeeds (or, otherwise, becomes known to the designer), the designer moves again by issuing "patches." The adversary responds with new attacks, and the game continues-an escalating "arms race." In this context, the entries of the F-matrix represent the designer's "payoff" to be maximized. To the designer, is still a distribution, and either the goal is to design for the most likely attack scenarios or design to prevent the most damaging ones from succeeding.
We will use computer networks to explain system security since computer network security is becoming a huge issue in our increasingly networked world. To illustrate the kinds of difficulties that arise in computer security consider a computer program that takes as input an -bit number. In order to know whether or not this program is secure, we may need to check the program's response for all possible inputs. Clearly as the number of bits increases, this eventually becomes a hopeless task. This is the software verification problem, and is known to be effectively intractable for large . Moreover, even verifying the correctness of all possible input strings may not be enough since attackers can be very clever. For instance, in the so-called buffer overflow attack, an input longer than -bits is submitted. For programs that do not check the input length, a long input can result in unexpected outcomes that in some cases result in the attacker being able to gain complete control of the computer.
Inspecting an F-matrix makes it immediately clear that designing against intelligent adversaries is much harder than designing against the "benign" randomness of nature. In particular, if all scenarios are feasible and within the capabilities of an attacker, then, since every outcome (the good as well as the bad) appear an equal number of times in each row (Lemma 2.1), it seems impossible to ensure security. This would be true except for the following two facts.
Fact 5.1 Attack Feasibility: Some attacks may not be feasible.
Fact 5.2 Attack Difficulty: Some attacks may require more effort on the part of the attacker than others.
These two facts immediately suggest the two main security techniques. The first technique aims to design the system in such a way that certain attacks are not feasible. The second technique is to design the system to make certain attacks so costly to carry out that they are beyond the capabilities of all but the most determined attackers. Denying network access to make attacks from the network infeasible is an example of the first technique. Using cryptography to increase the computational cost of attacks on data is an example of the second. The first technique highlights the "power of simplicity"-reduce features (by reducing ) and you exponentially reduce the number of possible attacks (since ). The second technique is harder to quantify with the F-matrix.
One way to reflect differences in the feasibility or difficulty of various attacks is to add another random variable and let where represents those random disturbances taking place in the system that the attacker himself cannot know or control, and represents those aspects the attacker can know and control.
This leads to the reasonable assumption that any single attacker will be limited (by the IA) in their ability to learn about our system and its defenses, construct an attack, and execute the attack. The problem, of course, is that for a computer connected to a network like the Internet, there is not just one attacker, but possibly many, each learning and sharing the vulnerabilities and attack techniques they discover. This effectively multiplies an attacker's power via parallel processing-parallel processing does not escape the IA, but it does speed things up. Add to this the even more difficult problem of attack by an employee who knows exactly how the system is designed and defended and therefore knows exactly its vulnerabilities. This is the particularly challenging security problem of insider attack. Considering again the ideal case defined in the previous section, let us dig a little deeper into the system security problem.
Theorem 5.1 Prior Probability of Attack Success: Let and assume the ideal case. Let be a P-optimal solution (i.e., a solution that is optimized against the assumed most likely attack scenarios). Now, suppose an attacker randomly chooses scenarios from among the first unplanned for columns. The probability at least one of these attacks will result in a bad outcome (succeed) is given by ceil ceil (6) Proof: Recall the definition of the set from Section IV and assume . In this case, if the solution is the S-optimal (unique in this case), then none of the attacks will succeed. So let us suppose that the P-optimal solution is not the S-optimal. From Theorem 4.3, the possibility of choosing one of these solutions is ceil ceil For these solutions, the probability that a column randomly chosen from among the first gives bad outcome is (7) Equation (7) follows from the fact that the submatrix obtained by eliminating the first row (corresponding to the S-optimal) and all except for the first columns is itself an F-matrix (by Lemma 2.3) and, thus, each row in this sub-matrix has an equal number of 1s and 0s (Lemma 2.1). The assumption that the row and column were chosen independently completes the proof.
What this result implies is that a fixed security solution subjected to repeated attack will almost certainly be compromised eventually since as increases (6) approaches, ceil . Another challenge regarding security is that the likelihood of various attacks tends to change over time. This differs from designing for performance, where we can often take to be time invariant. In computer security, once a particularly successful attack is discovered, it is often disseminated throughout the hacker community, and once this happens, the attack becomes almost certain to be employed. Moreover, since attacking computers can be automated, a whole suite of different attacks can come in rapid succession. Thus, to be secure, a system like a computer network generally has to be "robust" for many more attack scenarios than we could ever hope to deterministically verify and certify i.e., plan for. On the other hand, as the next result suggests, it may be possible to improve robustness with a randomized design approach.
Theorem 5.2 Design via Randomization: Let and assume the ideal case. Suppose we desire a solution that gives good performance (robust) over a specific set of scenarios . Let us choose a solution and evaluate it over a subset of these scenarios and suppose further that for all . Then, the probability that there exists a such that (bad outcome) is less than ceil (8) Proof: Let ceil . Without loss of generality, assume that . For the ideal case, the first ceil rows are P-optimal. It is also not hard to show that in the remaining ceil rows there are an equal number, , 1s and 0s. Thus, the probability that a fixed row returns 1 constantly for R randomly chosen columns from is
The desired result follows from the fact that for all This result is analogous to other known results on the "power of randomness." It is quite similar to probabilistic robustness [1] , which is based on the idea that if one can be satisfied with probabilistic performance guarantees, then one can often achieve robustness over a much larger range of situations. Also related are randomized algorithms [14] , [15] , whose premise is that if we can tolerate a small probability of exception, then some problems that are otherwise intractable can be made tractable. Then there is the well-known result in game theory that says that a randomized strategy always helps the player who must move first. Theorem 5.1 also provides justification for the common practice of random penetration testing (Red Teaming) for security evaluation and vulnerability analysis.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper presented the F-matrix, a conceptual framework for a broad qualitative analysis of the fundamental nature of optimization. The F-matrix provides insights and intuitions into limits related to optimization, complexity, and security. In particular, the F-matrix explains the NFLTs (Section III), the increasing fragilities that accompany growing complexity (Section IV), and the fundamental challenge of system security (Section V).
After many pages of machinations, we can summarize this entire paper in one sentence.
The essence of the decision sciences is optimization, and the essence of optimization is the search for "good intersections" between the rows (solutions) and columns (problems, scenarios, situations) of an F-matrix. That is it in a nutshell. From this single essential idea and the "intractabilities" engendered by the inherent limitations in our solution capabilities came a number of results, which we can summarize as follows.
• We must expect that as complexity increases, there will be more things we cannot plan for than things we can plan for, and for those we cannot plan for it is likely that some of them will lead to unsatisfactory outcome.
• In security, if we cannot account for every conceivable attack, then there may exist an attack that will defeat us. Two main implications should stick in our minds.
• Simple is better; if the number of possible mappings (columns) that need to be planned for or the number of alternatives (rows) one needs to decide between can be reduced, then, by all means, do it.
• When things get complex, randomness is a powerful tool for design, testing, and adapting. Randomization is so powerful, in fact, that it is convincingly argued that randomness (noise) is the wellspring of intelligence, even of life itself [16] . The F-matrix embodies all conceivable optimization problems involving an input space and an output space and, thus, provides a powerful tool for explaining and understanding the broad "global" nature of optimization. On the other hand, the F-matrix framework cannot answer narrow "local" questions about specific optimization problems. Specific optimization problems obviously concern a subset of the universe of all conceivable mappings. However, because the F-matrix cannot answer such "local" questions as: 1) how hard is it to evaluate ? (it is certainly not a matrix lookup) and 2) which of the columns are feasible? (in practice not all of them can be because of constraints), the F-matrix cannot help us to address, for example, the question, a seemingly "local" problem. Nevertheless, the F-matrix may point us to new research directions and, in any case, provides a powerfully intuitive pedagogical tool.
In closing, we make the following observation. In physics there is ongoing search for a theory of everything to reconcile the local geometry of space with its global topology [10] . We see the decision sciences as being in a similar position, where a theory is needed to bridge the gap between the global view of decision-making provided by frameworks such as the Fundamental matrix to the local difficulties we have to deal with to solve particular problem instances. Such a bridge will help to understand why some problems are fundamentally harder than others, and help address questions like . We hope that this paper provides the inspiration toward such theory.
